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No civilized nation confronting serious danger has ever relied exclusively on 
criminal convictions for past offenses. Every country has introduced, by one means or 
another, a system of preventive or administrative detention for persons who are 
thought to be dangerous but who might not be convictable under the conventional 
criminal law. 
                     – Alan Dershowitz2 
INTRODUCTION 
One tool in the current war on terror involves the Bush Administration’s labeling of 
alleged terrorists as “enemy combatants” and detaining them indefinitely, without 
access to counsel, and without having to file any criminal charges. This enemy 
combatant policy is really an ad hoc system of preventive detention whereby U.S. 
citizens or foreign nationals are detained against their will without the filing of criminal 
charges for the purposes of incapacitation and interrogation. President Bush has 
justified his unilateral decisions to label individuals as enemy combatants on the 
exercise of his war power as Commander in Chief under Article II of the Constitution 
and the Joint Resolution passed by Congress after 9/11 to use all “necessary and 
appropriate force” against those who “planned, authorized, committed or aided the 
terrorist attacks that occurred on September 11, 2001.”3 As law professors Samuel 
Issacharoff and Richard Pildes describe: “The most controversial legal power that the 
U.S. government has not just asserted but actually deployed at this point in the war on 
terrorism is probably the power to detain preventatively both citizens and noncitizens 
who the executive considers are ‘enemy combatants.’”4  
On July 21, 2008 – almost seven years after 9/11 – Attorney General Michael 
Mukasey argued in a speech before the American Enterprise Institute that preventive 
detention of terrorist suspects is an essential component of prosecuting this war on 
terror: 
The United States has every right to capture and detain enemy combatants in this 
conflict, and need not simply release them to the battlefield….We have every right 
to prevent them from returning to kill our troops or those fighting with us, and to 
target innocent civilians. And this detention often yields valuable intelligence 
about the intentions, organization, operations, and tactics of our enemy.  In 
short, detaining dangerous enemy combatants is lawful, and makes our Nation 
safer. … 
[T]o suggest that the government must charge detainees with crimes or release 
them is to seriously misunderstand the principal reasons why we detain enemy 
combatants in the first place: it has to do with self-protection, because these are 
dangerous people who pose threats to our citizens and to our soldiers.5 
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As America approaches a new presidential election and new Administration, one has to 
wonder whether President Bush’s version of preventive detention, e.g. the enemy 
combatant policy, will ultimately be repudiated as a mistaken experiment that 
needlessly sacrificed liberty and America’s reputation for questionable security gains or 
whether it or some alternative method of preventive detention will become part of 
America’s legal landscape for the indefinite future.  
 Israel and Britain, by comparison, have been dealing with terrorist threats for 
decades, and both countries have created various regimes of preventive detention of 
terrorist suspects to deal with the recurring reality of terrorism. While no one terrorist 
attack in either country resulted in 3,000 deaths, as did the 9/11 attack, both countries 
view terrorism as threats to national security and both countries grapple with the 
balance between security and liberty in their counterterrorism policies. Hence, in 
understanding the broader context of America’s enemy combatant policy, and analyzing 
whether preventive detention is needed in the war against terror, it is useful to look at 
other democracies that have dealt with asymmetric terrorist threats and observe how 
they have handled incapacitation and interrogation of terrorist suspects. As New York 
University law professor Stephen Schulhofer notes: “Fighting terrorism poses challenges 
that are essentially new (or newly recognized) for America. For that reason, it is worth 
considering the experience of Western democracies that confronted grave terrorist 
threats over extended periods before September 11, 2001.”6 To this end, he posits that 
Britain and Israel “offer two of the few available sources of recent experience in 
attempting to reconcile the demands of national survival and the rule of law in the 
context of an unremitting terrorist threat.”7 
As this article will illustrate, there are significant differences between the preventive 
detention regimes of Israel and Britain and America’s enemy combatant policy, namely: 
(1) the manner in which the preventive detention policies were created in the first place 
and (2) the ensuing substantive rights of the detainees. While America’s enemy 
combatant policy was created unilaterally by executive fiat based on claimed inherent 
constitutional authority, Israel’s and Britain’s preventive detention policies – which 
have changed throughout the decades – have virtually always been enacted by a 
legislative body and were not just executive usurpations of power. Moreover, both Israel 
and Britain have almost always had an explicit role for judicial review before subjecting 
the suspect to prolonged preventive incapacitation whereas President Bush has asserted 
that the executive branch can alone resolve factual disputes and determine whether an 
individual is an enemy combatant based on intelligence reports without any opportunity 
for the detainee to respond. Finally, and most significantly, the breadth and scope of 
Israel’s and the Britain’s current preventive detention policies are strikingly more 
modest than America’s. Although Britain is currently trying to increase pre-charge 
detention to forty-two days (and in July 2005 tried to increase pre-charge detention to 
ninety days), its current limit is twenty-eight days of preventive detention. While Israel 
has administratively detained some Palestinians for years, the detainees were allowed 
judicial review, generally within eight days, and are subject to renewals every six 
months. Conversely, President Bush has asserted his right to unilaterally label 
individuals as enemy combatants and detain them indefinitely and incommunicado for 
a war that may never end.  
Although all three countries are democracies dealing with terrorism and all struggle 
with balancing civil liberties with national security, America’s policy of preventive 
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detention is not just different as a matter of degree – it is grossly different as a matter of 
kind. An important question that needs to be addressed is to what extent, if any, is the 
threat America faces from terrorism graver than the threat faced by Israel, which is 
surrounded by hostile nations and has been in a state of emergency since its founding in 
1948, or the threat faced by Britain, which has a larger home-grown Islamic terrorism 
threat than America. If the threat that America faces is similar or not as severe, then the 
rationale for its more draconian preventive detention policies loses even more of its 
persuasiveness.  
As this article will demonstrate, historically both Britain’s and Israel’s preventive 
detention policies started with less judicial review and more executive discretion. Over 
the years as each country became more accustomed to its “emergency” situation, it 
provided more due process rights and judicial review to detainees even though the 
threat posed by terrorism did not diminish. Perhaps this is the United States’ fate, and it 
too will eventually provide more due process rights to its enemy combatants by 
involving Congress and the judiciary in creating and monitoring a preventive detention 
regime. The purpose of this article is to persuade the reader the United States needs to 
move in that direction.  
AMERICA’S ENEMY COMBATANT POLICY 
After September 11, 2001, the Administration decided to detain certain individuals 
suspected of being members or agents of al Qaeda or the Taliban as enemy combatants 
and hold them indefinitely and incommunicado for the duration of the war on terror. 
The rationale behind this system of preventive detention is to incapacitate suspected 
terrorists, facilitate interrogation, and hold them when traditional criminal charges are 
not feasible for a variety of reasons. By employing an armed-conflict model that treats 
terrorists as “combatants,” the Bush Administration argues it can preventively detain 
terrorists until the end of hostilities, despite there being no foreseeable ending scenario 
to an amorphous war on terror. Furthermore, terrorists are automatically “unlawful” or 
“enemy” combatants and hence not entitled to protections as true prisoners of war; yet, 
under the Bush Administration’s approach, they also are not entitled to the legal 
protections afforded criminals. As law professor David Luban notes: “By selectively 
combining elements of the war model and elements of the law model, Washington is 
able to maximize its own ability to mobilize lethal force against terrorists while 
eliminating most traditional rights of a military adversary, as well as the rights of 
innocent bystanders caught in the crossfire.”  
Designating individuals as enemy combatants and holding them indefinitely for a war 
on terror that may never end raises serious legal and policy concerns. After 9/11, the 
Administration determined that the Geneva Conventions did not apply to the conflict 
with the Taliban and al Qaeda.8 Hence, all Taliban and al Qaeda operatives were 
automatically unlawful “prisoners of war” and could be subjected to interrogation.9 In 
August 2002, Jay Bybee, then-assistant attorney general in the Office of Legal Counsel, 
sent President Bush a memorandum stating: “As commander-in-chief, the President has 
constitutional authority to order interrogations of enemy combatants to gain 
intelligence information concerning the military plans of the enemy.”10 According to 
John Yoo, former deputy assistant attorney general under the Bush Administration, 
“Information is the primary weapon in the conflict against this new kind of enemy, and 
intelligence gathered from captured operatives is perhaps the most effective means of 
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preventing future terrorist attacks upon U.S. territory.”11 As law professor Howard Ball 
observes, “the Administration has offered one fundamental rationale for such treatment 
[designations of enemy combatants]: the acquisition of actionable intelligence.”12    
In addition to the need for information, the Administration argues that its enemy 
combatant policy is necessary to incapacitate terrorists so they do not return to the 
battlefield. During the oral argument in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, then-Deputy Solicitor 
General Clement argued that incapacitation of Hamdi – a U.S. citizen turned over to 
U.S. forces by the Northern Alliance in Afghanistan – was a legitimate rationale for 
designating him an enemy combatant. Clement posited that the Administration needed 
to detain Hamdi so he would not rejoin the battlefield while the United States had 
10,000 American troops in Afghanistan.13 Yet, if the battlefield includes the whole world 
and the war is indefinite, the implication of incapacitation as a rationale for prevention 
detention is staggering. Essentially, under the enemy combatant policy, the executive 
branch can unilaterally designate any person in the world as an enemy combatant and 
hold that individual incommunicado, indefinitely, and with no criminal charges for the 
purposes of coercive interrogation and incapacitation.   
The Administration has applied its enemy combatant policy to U.S. citizens and legal 
residents (hereafter called U.S. persons) as well as foreign nationals captured overseas. 
With respect to U.S. persons, Jose Padilla (U.S. citizen arrested in Chicago), Yaser 
Hamdi (U.S. citizen arrested in Afghanistan), and Ali Saleh Kahlah al-Marri (legal 
resident arrested in Peoria, Illinois) have all been designated at one point as enemy 
combatants and subjected to this Administration’s preventive detention regime.14 The 
cases of Hamdi and Padilla have been resolved. After a plurality of the Supreme Court 
ruled in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld that Hamdi must be allowed to challenge his designation as 
an enemy combatant in a neutral forum,15 the Administration released him to Saudi 
Arabia in 2004 without any kind of adversarial hearing, thereby undermining – to some 
extent – its rationale of needing to detain this dangerous individual so he did not return 
to the battlefield.16 The Administration transferred Padilla to the criminal justice system 
in 2005, presumably to avoid a show-down at the Supreme Court over its enemy 
combatant policy.17 Padilla was subsequently convicted of terrorism-related charges and 
sentenced to seventeen years in prison in 2007. 
As of this writing, it appears that al-Marri is the only U.S. person currently being 
detained as an enemy combatant. On July 15, 2008, in al-Marri v. Pucciarelli, the full 
Fourth Circuit ruled in a split decision 5-4 that the Administration does have the 
authority to designate U.S. persons captured in peaceful civilian areas as enemy 
combatants but that the government needs to submit more than a declaration based on 
hearsay to support such a designation, or explain why a declaration is the “most reliable 
available evidence” to support indefinite detention of al-Marri as an enemy combatant.18 
Consequently, the Fourth Circuit remanded the case for further evidentiary proceedings 
to allow al-Marri to better challenge the underlying evidence. On September 19, 2008, 
al-Marri requested an interlocutory appeal to the Supreme Court arguing that the Joint 
Resolution did not authorize his indefinite military detention without criminal charge or 
trial based on the government’s assertions that he conspired with al Qaeda. It is 
presently unclear whether the Supreme Court will grant certiorari in the matter or allow 
the evidentiary hearing to proceed.  In sum, as of this writing, the Supreme Court has 
not ruled on the pivotal constitutional question of whether U.S. citizens, such as Padilla, 
or legal residents, such as al-Marri – who are captured in peaceful civilian areas away 
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from a battlefield – can be detained indefinitely as enemy combatants with no criminal 
charges.  
 As of June 2008, there are approximately 270 foreign nationals being detained at 
Guantanamo Bay as enemy combatants.19 On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held in 
Boumediene v. Bush that the detainees must be allowed to challenge their detention in 
federal court through the writ of habeas corpus.20 The Supreme Court explicitly stated, 
however: “We do not address whether the President has authority to detain these 
petitioners nor do we hold that the writ must issue. These and other questions regarding 
the legality of the detention are to be resolved in the first instance by the District 
Court.”21 In other words, even after seven years of the enemy combatant policy, the 
standard of review and substantive standards justifying detention as an enemy 
combatant remain unclear. Significantly, the legality of the Bush Administration’s 
enemy combatant policy as applied to both U.S. persons and foreign nationals remains 
unsettled as of this writing. 
Assuming there is a genuine need for preventive detention as a tool in the war on 
terror, and assuming a regime can be created that is lawful, there remains the 
underlying question of sound policy: to what extent can the United States create a 
system of preventive detention that is perceived as fair, applied consistently, and 
narrowly-tailored to meets its objectives. A significant negative repercussion to the 
enemy combatant policy is that other democratic countries may be hesitant to cooperate 
with the United States in pursuing terrorist suspects due to displeasure at the United 
States’ preventive detention policies. Not surprisingly, the enemy combatant policy has 
sparked criticism from individuals across the political spectrum.22 
Given that the war on terror is unlikely to end soon and given the inevitable change in 
administration that will occur in 2008, it is an opportune time to think through the 
complex legal and policy issues now and be ready to propose a better solution to the new 
Administration. Analyzing how Israel and Britain have dealt with incapacitation and 
interrogation of terrorist suspects can help with this endeavor. Professor Thomas 
Powers notes: “The policies of Britain and Israel each moved in the same direction: 
toward greater legal clarity and toward more extensive due process protections. The 
United States should take advantage of those countries’ experiences to find ways to 
build due process into preventive detention.”23 
ISRAEL’S PREVENTIVE DETENTION POLICIES 
In Israel, preventive detention is called “administrative detention” and is distinct from 
criminal detention. Administrative detention is defined as detention without charges or 
trial and is authorized by administrative order rather than by judicial decree.24 It can be 
used solely for prevention.25 According to Haifa University law professor Emanual 
Gross, administrative detention is based on the danger to state or public security posed 
by a particular person whose release would likely threaten the security of the state and 
the ordinary course of life.26 The goals of administrative detention are not arrest, trial, 
conviction, and punishment but rather prevention. Although difficulty in convicting a 
person in ordinary criminal proceedings is not a reason for employing administrative 
detention, if evidence is classified and cannot be disclosed, administrative detention 
becomes an option.27  
Significantly, Israel has separate administrative detention policies for Israel proper 
versus the Palestinian Territories, much like America’s enemy combatant policy as 
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applied to U.S. persons, Hamdi, al-Marri, and Padilla, who were/are detained in 
America versus aliens captured overseas and held at Guantanamo Bay or Bagram 
airbase in Afghanistan. While Israel’s detention laws provide for judicial review and 
considerably more due process for its detainees than America’s enemy combatant 
policy, Israel’s administrative detention policies nonetheless invoke criticism from civil 
rights groups within Israel. 
I.  Israel Proper 
In 1948, when Israel achieved its independence, Israel adopted the British Mandate’s 
Defense (Emergency) Regulations of 1945, which empowered the High Commissioner 
and Military Commander to detain any person it deemed necessary for maintaining 
public order or securing public safety or state security. In 1979, Israel reformed its 
detention laws and enacted a new statute: the Emergency Powers (Detentions) Law of 
1979 (EPDL of 1979), which provided more rights to detainees than the prior 
regulations, such as requiring that a detainee be brought before the president of the 
district court within forty-eight hours after arrest for judicial review of the detention, 
allowing appeals to the Supreme Court, and mandating periodic reviews by the 
president of the district court every three months.28 While the EPDL of 1979 only 
applies once a state of emergency has been proclaimed by the Israeli Knesset (Israel’s 
legislature), Israel has been in such a state of emergency since its inception in 1948.  
Under the EPDL of 1979, Israeli citizens and non-citizens within Israel can be 
detained if the defense minister has “reasonable cause to believe that reasons of state 
security or public security” requires it, although “state security” and “public security” 
have never been expressly defined.29 The district court in reviewing the detention order 
must vacate the order if it does not find “objective reasons of state security or public 
security” that require the detention or if the detention “was made in bad faith or from 
irrelevant considerations.”30 A detainee may appeal the district court’s decision directly 
to the Israeli Supreme Court, which requires that the danger to the State must be “so 
grave as to leave no choice but to hold the suspect in administrative detention” or that 
the detainee “would almost certainly pose a danger to public or State security.”31 Unlike 
America where an enemy combatant can be held indefinitely, the detention order in 
Israel is limited to six months, although it can be indefinitely renewed.32 Hence, this six-
month distinction may be more form than substance. Matti Friedman of the Jerusalem 
Post notes that “in theory, someone could be held ad infinitum” under Israel’s 
administrative detention policies and in practice some Palestinians have been held for 
years in administrative detention.33  
During the detention proceedings, the judge sees all the evidence, even if it is 
classified, and the judge decides what evidence may be disclosed to the detainee and 
his/her counsel.34  Therefore, some detainees are held without knowledge of the specific 
allegations against them and without a meaningful opportunity to rebut the charges.35 
Such a practice has caused B’Tselem, an Israeli human rights group, to decry that “Israel 
has therefore made a charade out of the entire system of procedural safeguards in both 
domestic and international law regarding the right to liberty and due process.”36 It 
further argues that Israel has used administrative detention to detain Palestinians for 
their political opinions and non-violent political activity.37 
Similar to some of the rationales for America’s enemy combatant policy,38 one 
rationale for Israel’s administrative detention is to protect sources and methods and 
BLUM, PREVENTION DETENTION  
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
7 
allow otherwise inadmissible evidence such as hearsay into evidence.39 Prolonged 
incapacitation for purposes of interrogation, however, does not seem to be a primary 
rationale in Israel, which stands in stark contrast to America’s principal rationale for its 
enemy combatant policy.40 Unlike America (at least so far), Israel has also detained 
terrorists under administrative detention who have completed their criminal sentences 
if there is a fear they might engage in subsequent terrorist activities against Israel.41 
Such a rationale B’Tselem argues means that Israel has totally blurred the “distinction 
between preventive and punitive detention.”42  
II. Palestinian Territories 
In the West Bank and Gaza Strip, administrative detentions are generally enforced 
pursuant to various military orders. The military orders allow a senior military 
commander to detain an individual for up to six months, although it can be indefinitely 
renewed as in Israel proper, if the commander has “reasonable grounds to presume that 
the security of the area or public security require the detention.”43 As in Israel proper, 
the terms “security of the area” and “public security” are not defined and their respective 
interpretations have been left to the military commanders.44 The detainees are allowed 
to appeal the military orders to the Israeli Supreme Court, which sits in these cases as a 
High Court of Justice. As the High Court of Justice, the Court may hear “matters in 
which it deems it necessary to grant relief for the sake of justice.”45  
Unlike America’s detainees at Guantanamo Bay who receive no access to a lawyer for 
their initial status determination or review hearings46 (although this may change based 
on the Supreme Court’s recent June 2008 decision in Boumediene), a detainee in the 
Palestinian Territories is entitled to a lawyer, and an appearance before a judge is 
generally required within eight days of arrest (by comparison to forty-eight hours in 
Israel proper).47 Throughout the decades, however, different military orders have 
changed the number of days a detainee can be held without seeing an attorney and the 
number of days before judicial review. For instance, in 1970, Military Order 378 allowed 
military authorities to impede access to counsel for thirty days for individuals suspected 
of violating security laws.48 Specifically, Order 378 allowed the head of the investigation 
to bar access to a lawyer for fifteen days, and a reviewing administrator could extend the 
bar for an additional fifteen days if convinced that the measure was “necessary for the 
security of the area or for the benefit of the investigation.”49 In 2002, a military order 
gave the commanding officer the authority to prevent a detainee from meeting with a 
lawyer for up to thirty-four days if the officer believed that such a meeting with the 
lawyer would impede the effectiveness of the interrogation.50 The Israeli Supreme Court 
upheld this provision finding that, on balance, the risk of damage to the investigation or 
national security outweighed the immediate right to an attorney.51 The detention, 
however, was not incommunicado; after forty-eight hours, the detainees had the right to 
be visited by the International Red Cross (IRC) and their families were informed of their 
whereabouts.52  By contrast, in America, the Bush Administration barred al-Marri from 
seeing his attorneys or the IRC until after he had been in incommunicado detention for 
sixteen months.53 
Israel uses administrative detention more aggressively against Palestinians than 
against Israeli citizens. According to Amnesty International, between 2000 and 2005, 
thousands of Palestinians were held in administrative detention, some of them for more 
than three years, while during that same time period only four Israelis were placed in 
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administrative detention for periods ranging from six weeks to six months.54 Israel’s use 
of administrative detention has also increased since the second intifada. Before the start 
of the first intifada in 1987, Israel had about 200 administrative detainees.55 According 
to B’Tselem, by 2007, Israel held a monthly average of 830 Palestinians in 
administration detention, which was one hundred higher than in 2006.56 As of February 
2008, Israel is holding 780 Palestinians in administration detention57 (at its height, 
Guantanamo Bay held about 750 prisoners).58 By comparison, over the years, only nine 
Israeli citizens residing in settlements in the West Bank have been administratively 
detained for periods up to six months.59 Similarly, in America, most of its enemy 
combatants are held overseas and there appear to have been only three enemy 
combatants who were U.S. persons. 
Although Israel’s administrative detention regimes in both the territories and Israel 
proper provide more due process and substantive rights to its detainees than America’s 
enemy combatant policy, many civil libertarians in Israel deride administrative 
detention as inhumane and undemocratic. Hebrew University law professor David 
Kretzmer argues that the main problem with administrative detention is the “temptation 
to use it even when it’s not necessary.”60 He argues that it is overused in the territories 
instead of employing the criminal justice system and that Israel fails to recognize the 
“distinction between legitimate political activity and unlawful conduct that endangers 
security.”61 
III. Role of Israel’s Judiciary  
Unlike America where the Supreme Court has been largely (but not entirely) deferential 
to the executive branch on matters of preventive detention, the Israeli Supreme Court 
has been extremely activist and attentive to due process and human rights issues raised 
by administrative detention. In fact, the Knesset has often criticized the activist nature 
of the Israeli Supreme Court, arguing that it oversteps its bounds and second guesses 
the will of the people as expressed by their elected representatives.  
Israel has been in a state of war since its founding in 1948 – with frequent uprisings 
in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. Moreover, terrorist organizations such as Hamas, the 
Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine, and the Palestinian Islamic Jihad have 
directly targeted Israeli civilians, largely with suicidal attacks in Israeli cities. Terrorism 
against Israel increased dramatically after the second intifida, beginning in September 
2000 and continuing to this day. According to Israel’s Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 960 
Israeli citizens have been killed by terrorists between 2000 and 2006 and 6,596 have 
been wounded. 62 In 2002 alone, there were 60 separate suicide attacks against Israeli 
targets63 – more than during the previous eight years combined.64 Yet, as Professor 
Schulhofer notes, although the Palestinian intifada has grown in intensity since 1999, 
“Israeli courts have become increasingly interventionist” and not increasingly 
deferential to military authorities.65  Harvard Professor Philip Heymann expresses a 
similar sentiment: “The contrast with Israel is revealing. Even in the midst of the 
intifada, the Israeli Supreme Court has asserted some level of judicial review over 
government actions that affect Palestinians, both within Israel and also within the West 
Bank and Gaza.”66 
For instance, in 2002, the Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) undertook a military 
operation known as Defensive Shield (or Defensive Wall) in response to an extremely 
bloody month of terrorist attacks in Israel which culminated in a suicide bomber killing 
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dozens of Israelis during a Passover dinner at a hotel. As a result, IDF arrested 
thousands of Palestinians and, pursuant to a new military order,67 detained them for 
eighteen days (and then twelve days) without judicial review based on an IDF officer’s 
determination that the “circumstances of [the person’s] detention raise the suspicion 
that he endangers or may be a danger to the security of the area, the IDF, or the 
public.”68  In Marab v. IDF Commander in the West Bank, the Israeli Supreme Court 
invalidated the military order that allowed investigative detention of Palestinians in the 
West Bank for twelve days without a judicial hearing for purposes of interrogation.69 
Rejecting the government’s claim that effective interrogation and security merited the 
delay, the Court held that prompt judicial review of detention is an inherent part of the 
legality of the detention measure because the detainee is still presumed innocent.70 The 
Court found that detaining Palestinians twelve days without judicial review was “in 
conflict with the fundamentals of both international and Israeli law,” which view 
“judicial review of detention proceedings essential for the protection of individual 
liberty.”71  Significantly – and in stark contrast to America – the Israeli Supreme Court 
ruled that even “an ‘unlawful combatant’ . . . is to be brought promptly before a judge.”72  
The Israeli Supreme Court, however, deferred its ruling for six months to allow the IDF 
to create a new regime of detention and arrest.73 Israel went back to allowing eight days 
before judicial review. 
Interestingly, while the Israeli Supreme Court in Marab did not allow twelve days 
before judicial review, it did allow the IDF to postpone access to counsel for up to thirty-
four days, meaning that some detainees would attend their judicial review hearing 
without the benefit of counsel. The Court based this determination on “significant 
security considerations.”74  Importantly, the Court explicitly noted that “advancing the 
investigation [e.g., facilitating interrogation] is not a sufficient reason to prevent the 
meeting . . . . there must be an element of necessity.”75 This, of course, stands in stark 
contrast to America where the main rationale for years of incommunicado detention is 
to facilitate interrogation without interference posed by attorneys. 
While the Israeli Supreme Court does not hesitate to involve itself in the minutia of 
administrative detention (e.g., discussing the exact number of days before judicial 
review and access to counsel), the U.S. Supreme Court by contrast has largely avoided 
the substantive details concerning preventive detention and focused more on narrow 
jurisdictional issues. For instance, in Rasul v. Bush, the U.S. Supreme Court held that 
the foreign nationals (similar to Israel’s detainees in the Palestinian Territories) held at 
Guantanamo Bay had a right to challenge their detentions in federal court with a writ of 
habeas corpus.76  Yet the Court failed to provide any details on what proceedings, if any, 
would be appropriate. Therefore, there was no discussion of the time limits for 
incommunicado detention or judicial review and no discussion of what standards 
merited preventive detention in the first place. After Rasul, at the Bush Administration’s 
urging, Congress passed the Detainee Treatment Act (DTA) of 2005,77 which stripped 
the foreign nationals at Guantanamo Bay of their limited victory in Rasul and held that 
the federal courts did not have jurisdiction to hear habeas appeals challenging their 
detention.  
In June 2006, however, in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme Court interpreted the 
DTA restrictively, holding that it only applied prospectively from the date of enactment 
and did not remove jurisdiction from the federal courts in habeas proceedings pending 
on that date.78 Congress responded by passing the Military Commissions Act (MCA) of 
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2006 which stated that the DTA applied to all pending cases – not just those that 
occurred prospectively.79 On June 12, 2008, the Supreme Court held 5-4 in Boumediene 
v. Bush that the foreign nationals at Guantanamo have a right to challenge their 
detentions in U.S. civilian courts and that the MCA is unconstitutional to the extent that 
it precludes the jurisdiction of federal courts to entertain habeas petitions brought by 
them.80 Yet, Boumediene does not concern the substantive rights detainees have on the 
merits and what claims will be cognizable before federal courts. In fact, ironically, after 
six years of litigation, the aliens at Guantanamo have the same rights – or lack thereof – 
that Padilla, Hamdi, and al-Marri have: they all can bring habeas petitions before 
federal courts. As commentator George Will notes of Boumediene, “None [of the 
detainees] will be released by the court’s decision, which does not even guarantee a right 
to a hearing. Rather, it guarantees only a right to request a hearing.”81 In other words, 
while the Israeli Supreme Court has intervened and addressed substantive details of 
preventive detention (e.g., arguing that twelve days is too long before judicial review), 
the U.S. Supreme Court – six years later – is still standing on the sidelines.  
The same pattern has occurred with the enemy combatant cases involving U.S. 
persons detained in America. In Hamdi, the plurality of the U.S. Supreme Court merely 
held that after two years of incommunicado detention as an enemy combatant, Hamdi 
must be allowed a meaningful opportunity to challenge the designation of an enemy 
combatant in a neutral forum – something Israel’s 1979 law had already provided after a 
mere forty-eight hours for detainees arrested within Israel. Disappointingly, as in 
Rasul, Hamdi did not specify how long an enemy combatant could be held 
incommunicado or how long he could be held before being brought for judicial review. 
As Professor Schulhofer laments, the Supreme Court “expressed no impatience and 
showed no evident discomfort with the two-year-plus periods that detentions had been 
allowed to remain unreviewed.”82    
Similarly, in Padilla v. Rumsfeld, the U.S. Supreme Court rejected Padilla’s appeal on 
jurisdictional grounds – finding 5-4 that Padilla filed his habeas petition in the wrong 
jurisdiction – and did not reach any of the substantive issues concerning his indefinite 
and incommunicado detention. As Professor Schulhofer observes: “After more than two 
years of detention, virtually all of it incommunicado, and after persistent, unsuccessful 
efforts to secure the rights to counsel and to a hearing on the allegations against him, 
Padilla obtained no relief whatsoever. He was told to start again in another court.”83 
When Padilla’s case was about to reach the Supreme Court for a second time, the 
Administration switched course and transferred him to the criminal justice system 
where he was subsequently convicted and sentenced to seventeen years for terrorism-
related charges. In sum, the Supreme Court in Israel is exceedingly more proactive in 
scrutinizing the details of administrative detention to guarantee basic human rights 
while the U.S. Supreme Court is much more reticent and deferential to the executive 
branch. 
Some of these differences between the Israeli and U.S. Supreme Courts can be 
attributed to their divergent views on standing and justiciability. While in America the 
Supreme Court tends to be deferential to the executive branch during times of war, in 
Israel, which has been in a perpetual state of war, the Israeli Supreme Court believes 
that it can review virtually all activities conducted by the executive branch whether in 
Israel proper or the Palestinian Territories. In fact, there is almost no standing 
requirement for the Israeli Supreme Court – almost any person directly affected by state 
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action can petition the Court that the action was unlawful, although the Court will not 
substitute its own discretion for the executive’s decisions on operational issues or 
counter-terrorism measures.84 In fact, even organizations interested in the fate of a 
detainee can appeal to the Israeli Supreme Court.85 As Israeli Supreme Court Registrar 
Yigal Mersel notes: “The approach of the [Israeli] Court is to balance human rights and 
national security on a case-by-case basis; this approach manifests itself in an almost 
total willingness to hear any case challenging any counter-terrorism activity, without 
reservations of standing or justiciability.”86 According to Chief Justice Barak, 
“everything is justiciable.”87 In other words, if a petitioner argues that the military is 
acting unlawfully, the petition will not normally be rejected on the grounds that the 
petitioner is not an Israeli citizen or inhabitant.88  
Conversely, the U.S. Supreme Court has strict standing and jurisdictional 
requirements as demonstrated by the years of litigation just concerning whether the 
detainees at Guantanamo Bay could bring habeas petitions challenging their detentions 
in federal court. A fundamental difference between the Israeli and U.S. Supreme Courts 
is that the U.S. Supreme Court is restricted to ruling on specific cases that have been 
previously adjudicated and hence cannot opine on broader policy issues as can the 
Israeli Supreme Court. Given the U.S. Supreme Court’s greater standing and 
jurisdictional restrictions, it could be argued that Congress needs to take the initiative to 
protect the procedural and substantive rights of detainees more than does the Supreme 
Court. Stated differently, while the Israeli Supreme Court is activist (much to the 
chagrin of the Knesset) and often protects substantive human rights, the U.S.’s differing 
system of government leads to the conclusion that Congress needs to play this role.  
IV. Israel’s 2002 Unlawful Combatants Act 
In 2000, the Israeli Supreme Court held that the EPDL of 1979 did not allow Israel to 
detain individuals who are not themselves terrorist threats for “bargaining chips.”89 The 
Court held that the particular terrorist had to pose a risk and could not be held simply as 
a negotiating tool despite the fact that his detention might be crucial to state security 
and the release of Israeli soldiers. Rather, the Court found that an individual’s detention 
had to ensue from the dangers posed by his release.90  
As a result of this decision, the Knesset enacted the 2002 Incarceration of Unlawful 
Combatants Law, which allows Israel to detain “members of a force perpetrating hostile 
acts against Israel” even without a showing of immediate threat or individual 
involvement in terrorist acts.91  Although this law provides for access of counsel within 
seven days of detention, judicial review within fourteen days of detention, and a right of 
appeal to the Supreme Court within thirty days,92 this law would theoretically allow 
Israel to detain terrorist members based on mere association. The detainee can be held 
until the Minister of Defense determines that the group with which the detainee is 
associated has ceased hostilities against Israel or until a court determines that the 
detainee’s release would not threaten state security.93 Significantly, if the Minister of 
Defense determines in writing that a force engages in hostile acts, this finding is 
presumed correct unless the detainee can prove otherwise.94 After the initial detention 
hearing, the detention must be reviewed by the district court every six months (in 
contrast to every three months under the 1979 law).95 It appears that Israel has used this 
law only a few times, against high-profile terrorists from abroad. Most recently, Israel 
used it to detain Hezbollah fighters during the summer of 2006.96 
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By comparison, in 2005, Rep. Adam Schiff (D-CA) introduced the Detention of 
Enemy Combatants Act (DECA) (HR 1076) to the House of Representatives but it never 
became law.97  The purpose of DECA was to “authorize the President to detain an enemy 
combatant who is a United States person or resident who is a member of al Qaeda or 
knowingly cooperated with members of al Qaeda, to guarantee timely access to judicial 
review to challenge the basis for a detention, to permit the detainee access to counsel, 
and for other purposes.”98  Significantly, DECA explicitly stated that “Congress has a 
responsibility for maintaining vigorous oversight of detention of United States citizens 
and lawful residents to assure that such detentions are consistent with due process.”99 
Furthermore, in order to detain an “enemy combatant” under DECA, the President 
would need to certify that (A) “the United States Armed Forces are engaged in a state of 
armed conflict with al Qaeda and an investigation with a view toward prosecution, a 
prosecution, or a post-trial proceeding in the case of such person or resident is ongoing; 
or (B) detention is warranted in order to prevent such person or resident from aiding 
persons attempting to commit terrorist acts against the United States.”100 Importantly, 
like Israel, the certifications would be effective for 180 days but able to be renewed with 
successive certifications.101 Judicial review would occur at the United States District 
Court for the District of Columbia where detainees could challenge – with the assistance 
of counsel – the basis of the detention.102 Yet, DECA did not proscribe any particular 
time frame that a detainee could be held incommunicado or otherwise brought for 
judicial review, instead relying on vague generalities about future rules that shall 
“guarantee timely access to judicial review to challenge the basis for a detention, and 
permit the detainee access to counsel.”103 Significantly, had DECA been enacted, it 
would have been similar to Israel’s law that passed in 2002, although Israel’s Act did 
specifically provide strict time frames for judicial review and access to counsel.  
Yet, because DECA was not passed into law – and no alternative legislation has been 
enacted – the executive branch still argues it retains the right to unilaterally label a U.S. 
person caught in a civilian area as an enemy combatant and hold that person 
indefinitely, although pursuant to Hamdi that individual must be allowed to challenge 
that designation in a neutral forum. On the other hand, Israel’s 2002 Incarceration of 
Unlawful Combatants Law effectively allows Israel to “take hostages” to secure the 
release of Israeli prisoners. Thus, an argument could be made that such a rationale is 
more draconian than the U.S. enemy combatant policy where at least the enemy 
combatants are themselves (alleged) unsavory characters. Neither policy is refreshing. 
V.  Summary of Analysis: Israel versus United States 
While Israel’s administrative detention used primarily against Palestinians has several 
problems (namely, that secret evidence can be used to detain individuals for indefinite 
renewals of six months), it nonetheless provides more transparency and due process 
than America’s form of preventive detention employed in its enemy combatant policy. 
Although Israel has not suffered a catastrophic terrorist attack on the scale of 9/11, 
between 2000 and 2006 Israel suffered 152 attacks in a country with a population of 
close to seven million.104 Unlike America, however, it has always allowed judicial review 
of its administrative detention of individuals and allowed access to counsel. Although 
the number of days has changed throughout the decades, the maximum number of days 
a detainee can be held without access to counsel in Israel is thirty-four days and the 
maximum number of days before judicial review is eight days compared to America’s 
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indefinite and largely incommunicado detention. While pursuant to Hamdi, America’s 
enemy combatants must now be given a meaningful opportunity to challenge the 
designation presumably with counsel, the details of that review and how long the person 
initially can be held without judicial review and access to counsel are still unresolved. As 
Heymann observes, “though our danger is far less than the danger that Israel faces, our 
willingness to abandon the most fundamental judicial protections of personal security 
has been far greater.”105 
Significantly, the rationales for preventive detention are also different between the 
two countries. While both countries attest they need preventive detention when 
evidence is classified or inadmissible – or when they do not want to compromise 
methods and sources – America further asserts that it needs preventive detention to 
gain actionable intelligence from the detainees, and that access to counsel will thwart 
that purpose. By contrast, Israel’s Supreme Court refused to allow incommunicado 
detention for a mere thirty-four days based on such a rationale. Israel, however, uses 
administrative detention to continue to detain individuals that are dangerous to Israel’s 
security after the completion of their criminal sentences. America has not yet articulated 
this rationale but it may be too soon to tell since all of America’s convicted terrorists are 
still serving their sentences such as Jose Padilla, Richard Reid, and John Walker Lindh. 
Finally, Israel has never claimed that its executive branch or military could 
unilaterally create a system of administrative detention without input from the 
legislative or judicial branches. In fact, even at the height of suicidal terrorist attacks in 
2002, the IDF only authorized detention of eighteen days (then dropped it to twelve 
days) without judicial review (which was struck down by the Israeli Supreme Court). It 
is telling that Israel’s military only tried to obtain preventive detention for weeks 
compared to President Bush’s claim of indefinite detention without judicial review.  
Although Israel’s administrative detention policies highlight some substantial flaws 
in America’s system of preventive detention, it is also useful to look at how Britain has 
dealt with its various terrorism threats throughout the decades. As will be shown, while 
Israel and America view the conflict with terrorism more as a “war” using terms such as 
“unlawful” or “enemy” combatants, Britain treats terrorists more as criminals, and its 
preventive detention regime reflects a need for additional time to investigate potential 
terrorist acts as crimes. 
BRITAIN’S PREVENTIVE DETENTION POLICIES 
In Britain, preventive detention is presently called “pre-charge detention” and is used to 
increase the time for investigation of a potential crime before charging the suspect. 
Unlike the Israeli model, pre-charge detention in Britain cannot be used to detain an 
individual after completion of a criminal sentence because he/she is a threat to security, 
and unlike the practice in the United States, pre-charge detention does not appear to be 
used solely for interrogation to gain useful intelligence, although this can be part of the 
rationale. Britain’s form of preventive detention is really in support of its criminal 
justice system. There is no argument that terrorists are unlawful or enemy combatants 
and no discussion of how to create a regime outside of criminal law. As a British 
government committee noted in April 2002: “Terrorists are criminals, and therefore 
ordinary criminal justice and security provisions should, so far as possible, continue to 
be the preferred way of countering terrorism.”106  
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I.  Britain’s Emergency Executive Powers 
While Britain’s current preventive detention regime is framed as pre-charge detention 
under its criminal justice system, this was not always the case. During both World Wars, 
Britain used virtually unchecked executive power to detain individuals suspected of 
being spies or otherwise hostile to the nation. Regulation 14B, enacted in 1915, allowed 
the home secretary (responsible for internal affairs in Britain and Wales) to order the 
internment of any person “for securing the public safety or the defense of the realm.”107 
Detainees could not use habeas corpus to challenge the detentions in court; rather, a 
government committee could recommend, but not order, release. The House of Lords 
ruled that it was “necessary in a time of great public danger to entrust great powers to 
[the executive]” and assumed that “such powers will be reasonably exercised.”108 Similar 
powers were enacted during World War II with Regulation 18B, under which 2,000 
individuals were detained without trial.109 Many were British citizens, including leaders 
of right-wing fascist originations. Although Winston Churchill initially supported 
Regulation 18B during World War II, he ultimately condemned it, and it was abolished 
after the war. He stated: “The power of the Executive to cast a man into prison without 
formulating any charge known to the law, and particularly to deny him the judgment of 
his peers, is in the highest degree odious and is the foundation of all totalitarian 
government whether Nazi or Communist.”110  
Emergency executive power to detain generally ended after World War II. Britain 
then promulgated a series of emergency regulations that were constantly renewed to 
deal with the threat posed by Irish Republicans and later al Qaeda.111 Instead of 
unfettered executive detention, the focus changed to pre-charge detention periods (the 
current maximum is twenty-eight days) with judicial review at varying intervals. While 
America also detained individuals during World War II (e.g., Japanese internment 
camps), Britain’s Regulations 14B and 18B during the World Wars seem similar to 
President’s Bush current claim of executive war powers to unilaterally detain terrorist 
suspects as enemy combatants. In other words, although Britain faced a serious terrorist 
threat with its conflict in Northern Ireland (between 1966 and 1999 a total of 3,636 
individuals lost their lives in violence related to the Northern Ireland conflict),112 it did 
not resort to executive detentions as it had during the World Wars but instead issued a 
series of regulations that, while controversial, at least allowed for judicial review of pre-
charge detention. Similar to Israel, as the terrorist threat increased, it could be argued 
that the Britain responded overall with more due process for terrorist suspects.  
II. Britain’s Emergency Regulations Pre 9/11 
While a detailed recounting of Britain’s conflict with Northern Ireland and its ensuing 
legal instruments to fight terrorism before 9/11 is beyond the scope of this article, with 
respect to pre-charge detention, there are some useful regulations to discuss. The 1939 
Prevention of Violence (Temporary Provisions) Act (PVA) empowered the home 
secretary to arrest and detain individuals without warrant for an initial period of forty-
eight hours and, with the authorization from the secretary of state, for an additional 
period of five days, making the total number seven days for pre-charge detention.113 The 
PVA was supposed to be temporary and only last two years; however, it was not until 
1952 that it was allowed to expire and not until 1973 that it was formally repealed.114 Yet, 
in 1974, after IRA bombings of two pubs in Birmingham left twenty-one people dead 
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and 160 injured, the PVA was reintroduced again in 1974 as the Prevention of Terrorism 
(Temporary Provisions) Act of 1974 (PTA).115 Section 12 (1b) of the PTA allowed the 
British police to arrest and detain anyone they reasonably suspected “to be or have been 
involved in acts of terrorism” for seven days without charge with the approval of the 
secretary of state. For the first forty-eight hours, the suspects could be held without 
access to attorneys.116  Under general criminal law, by comparison, pre-charge detention 
could not and presently cannot exceed ninety-six hours (four days) and the suspect is 
entitled to see an attorney within the first thirty-six hours.117 It is interesting to note 
that, when faced with a serious terrorist threat, Britain increased incommunicado 
detention a mere twelve hours (from thirty-six hours to forty-eight hours) while 
incommunicado detention has been more than two years for America’s enemy 
combatants with no prescribed statutory limit at all. 
The PTA was rewritten in 1976, 1984, and again in 1989, but continued to stay as 
emergency “temporary” powers that had to be renewed each year until the 2000 
Terrorism Act, discussed below. The seven days of pre-change detention stayed the 
same throughout the PTA’s existence. From 1974 until 1996, 27,000 people were 
arrested under the PTA alone. Although fewer than 15 percent were subsequently 
charged with a crime, according to terrorism expert and Professor Linda Donahue, the 
information gained during questioning most likely decreased the level of violence.118  
In 1972, as the conflict and violence in Northern Ireland escalated, the British 
government appointed Lord Diplock to head an inquiry into needed emergency powers 
to deal with the growing terrorist threat in Northern Ireland. The resulting 1973 
Northern Ireland (Emergency Provisions) Act (EPA) empowered the government to 
intern terrorist suspects for seventy-two hours without charges based on mere 
subjective suspicion (reasonableness was not even required). In 1987, these special 
arrest powers for Northern Ireland were suspended and instead the PTA provision 
requiring “reasonable grounds” before detainment was employed.119 While the EPA (like 
the PTA) was supposed to be temporary, it lasted twenty-six years until the 2000 
Terrorism Act (discussed below).120 Although Britain had a tendency to enact restrictive 
legislation under the guise of being “emergency” legislation, the laws were continued 
because they proved effective.121 Donahue points out, however, that the effectiveness of 
security had a corresponding negative effect on civil liberties, including increased 
friction within Northern Ireland and unwelcome international attention on British 
domestic affairs.122  
After the peace process with Northern Ireland in 1999, Britain began to focus more 
on international terrorism, including al Qaeda.123 In 2000, Britain passed permanent 
counterterrorism legislation (no more discussions of “temporary” measures) with the 
2000 Terrorism Act (TA). While originally the TA only allowed seven days for pre-
charge detention, it was amended in 2003 to increase the total possible period of 
detention without charge to fourteen days for any individual reasonably suspected of 
being a terrorist.124  Between the date of the amendment and September 4, 2005, 357 
people were arrested of whom thirty-six were held in excess of seven days. 125  In other 
words, although the police had the ability to hold suspects for fourteen days in pre-
charge detention, they exercised that power infrequently.  
BLUM, PREVENTION DETENTION  
HOMELAND SECURITY AFFAIRS, VOLUME IV, NO. 3 (OCTOBER 2008) WWW.HSAJ.ORG 
16 
III. Britain’s Regulations Post 9/11 
Like Israel and America, Britain proposed different preventive detention or pre-charge 
detention policies for its citizens compared to aliens residing within its borders. While 
Britain has never held an individual outside its borders as the United States has at 
Guantanamo Bay or Israel has in the Palestinian Territories, Britain’s preventive 
detention policy towards its foreign nationals after 9/11 was more draconian than the 
procedures applied to its own citizens, causing much uproar and the policy’s eventual 
demise. 
A. Foreign Nationals in Britain 
After 9/11, Britain adopted additional legal measures with the 2001 Anti-Terrorism, 
Crime, and Security Act (ATCSA) which provided stronger powers to allow the police to 
investigate and prevent terrorist activity and other serious crime. Sixty-seven British 
citizens died in the 9/11 attacks, and eleven of the nineteen suspected 9/11 hijackers had 
British links.126  The attack highlighted that terrorist organizations were using Britain to 
plan attacks.127  
While the ATCSA did not increase pre-charge detention for British citizens from the 
2000 TA’s seven days – that happened later in 2003 and again after the July 2005 
bombings – it did allow for the removal or indefinite detention of foreign nationals 
suspected of terrorist activity (albeit this part of ATCSA was limited to fifteen months, 
unless renewed by Parliament).128 Upon certification by the home secretary that the 
individual was an international terrorist whose presence in Britain created a risk to 
national security, that individual could be deported. If deportation could not occur 
because of Britain’s international obligation to prevent torture or other inhumane 
treatment, or because of national security concerns, then ATCSA provided the individual 
could be indefinitely detained – without trial – in Britain, unless the suspect agreed to 
go to another country and that country agreed to accept him.129  
Yet, ATCSA did provide some measure of review: a person detained or deported could 
appeal – with the assistance of counsel – the certification to the Special Immigration 
Appeals Commission (SIAC), which had the power to cancel the certification if it 
concluded there were not grounds for the home secretary’s certification.130  
Significantly, the appeal included two stages: an “open” one where the home secretary 
disclosed information and a “closed” one where classified information was made 
available to a security-cleared special advocate.131 Once receiving classified information, 
the special advocate was precluded from further communication with the suspect or his 
attorney. Unlike in Israel where a judge could prohibit both the suspect and his attorney 
from seeing classified information during the judicial proceeding for administrative 
detention, British law allows for a special advocate to access the information against the 
suspect and provide some measure of review. 
Nonetheless, ATCSA’s provisions regarding indefinite detention of foreign nationals 
did not survive scrutiny. The government ultimately repealed the provisions of ATCSA 
dealing with indefinite detention based on a House of Lords Judicial Committee 
December 2004 ruling that such powers were incompatible with articles of 
the European Commission on Human Rights relating to the right to liberty and the right 
to freedom from discrimination. The Committee found the indefinite detention powers 
to be discriminatory as they only applied to foreign nationals, not to British citizens, and 
that they were not proportionate to the threat Britain faced from terrorism.132  
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During the relatively short-life of ATCSA, Britain held seventeen foreign nationals, 
some more than two years.133 Of the seventeen, two men voluntarily left Britain and one 
individual was released under ATCSA and detained on other grounds.134 In October 
2003, the SIAC rejected appeals of ten of the remaining fourteen detainees.135 In other 
words, while the indefinite detention of foreign nationals under ATCSA was short-lived, 
it does not appear that the SIAC rejected many of the detentions on substantive 
grounds. Yet, even the indefinite detention provision of ATCSA – which was 
controversial and only lasted approximately three years – provided at the outset for 
some level of judicial review of the indefinite detention of foreign nationals.  
By contrast, the United States did not provide any review of the foreign nationals held 
at Guantanamo Bay until after the Supreme Court ruled in Hamdi and Rasul that enemy 
combatants must be allowed to challenge the designation in a neutral forum. As a result, 
the Bush Administration created Combatant Status Review Tribunals (CSRTs) where a 
three-panel board of military officers from the Department of Defense (not the 
judiciary) decides the detainees’ status based on the current threat assessment and 
intelligence value of each detainee. The detainees are not allowed attorneys; they cannot 
see evidence used that is considered classified; and there is a rebuttable presumption in 
favor of the government.136  
For aliens detained within the United States, the USA Patriot Act allowed detention 
by the attorney general without charge for seven days, after which the person needed to 
either be charged or removal proceedings commenced.137 If a detainee could not be 
otherwise deported and the “release of the alien was found to threaten the national 
security of the United States or the safety of the community or any person” the attorney 
general could hold the individual for renewable periods of six months.138 According to 
the inspector general of the Department of Justice, 762 aliens were arrested in 
connection with investigating 9/11 and the majority of these individuals were charged 
with immigration violations (such as overstaying visas).139 Ironically, foreign nationals 
under the USA Patriot Act have more due process rights than U.S. persons detained as 
enemy combatants. After all, the Administration detained Padilla as an enemy 
combatant for three and one-half years before bringing criminal charges, which seems 
to be in contrast to Britain and Israel where non-citizens are (or were in the case of 
Britain) treated in a harsher manner. 
B. British Citizens 
After terrorist bombs murdered fifty-two people in London on July 7, 2005, the Home 
Office (similar in some respects to the U.S. Department of Homeland Security) tried to 
increase pre-charge detention for British citizens from the fourteen days provided in the 
TA of 2000, as amended in 2003, to ninety days. Then-Prime Minister Tony Blair 
addressed Parliament by stating: “I have to try to do my best to protect people in this 
country and to make sure their safety and their civil liberty to life come first. Let us have 
a debate about the strength or otherwise of those proposals but for myself I find it a 
convincing case.”140 Although Parliament refused to extend pre-charge detention to 
ninety days in what was Mr. Blair’s first parliamentary defeat, it is significant to note 
that Mr. Blair presented his recommendation to Parliament and encouraged debate 
about the issue. This, of course, contrasts to President Bush’s unilateral decisions – 
without any debate or input from Congress – on the identity of enemy combatants and 
how long they can be held without access to counsel. 
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On July 3, 2006, the House of Commons Home Affairs Committee141 published a 
report entitled Terrorism Detention Powers, Fourth Report of Session 2005-06, which 
evaluated whether there was a legitimate justification to extend pre-charge detention to 
ninety days. The report articulated reasons to extend pre-charge detention beyond 
fourteen days: the international nature of terrorism; difficulties in establishing the 
identity of terrorist suspects; the need to find interpreters; the need to decrypt computer 
files; the length of time needed for scene examination and analysis; the length of time 
needed to obtain and analyze data from mobile phones; the need to allow for religious 
observance by detainees; and delays arising from solicitors’ consultations with multiple 
clients.142  Significantly, unlike in America, interrogation to gain intelligence was not one 
of the rationales listed as a justification for extending preventive detention, although 
certainly the detainees are allowed to be questioned during the pre-charge detention 
period. Yet, the report notes that “In general it cannot be expected that interviews of 
suspects during extended detention will lead to significant additional information that 
can be used in court.”143 According to the police, “the detention process is not about 
interviewing alone as many people do not answer questions in any event” and that “in 
the majority of suspect interviews, terrorist suspects are advised, and exercise, their 
right to remain silent.”144 By comparison, in America, enemy combatants are not 
allowed to meet with attorneys expressly because it would interfere with interrogation 
and questioning of terrorist suspects.145 The report concluded that ninety days of pre-
charge detention may be useful in some cases but that it was not essential.146 
While ninety days of pre-charge detention did not pass, as a compromise, in the 
Terrorism Act of 2006, twenty-eight days for pre-charge detention became the new 
limit.147 According to the TA of 2006, those arrested can be detained for forty-eight 
hours, after which the police or Crown Prosecution Service may apply to a judicial 
authority for an extension of the detention warrant.148 In other words, judicial review 
begins after forty-eight hours. Detention can only be authorized if it is necessary to (1) 
obtain relevant evidence by questioning the suspect; (2) preserve evidence or (3) to 
make a decision about the deportation or charging of the suspect.149 Applications to 
extend the detention period may be made for seven days at successive intervals up to a 
maximum of twenty-eight days.150 For the first fourteen days, the application for 
detention is made to a designated magistrate judge. Between days fourteen and twenty-
eight, the application must be made to a High Court judge.151 At each proceeding, the 
detainee can be represented by special counsel who has been cleared to handle classified 
information.152 This judicial review at week-long intervals stands in stark contrast to the 
Bush Administration’s claim of inherent constitutional authority to detain enemy 
combatants indefinitely and without access to counsel. Finally, in Britain, the home 
secretary appoints an independent reviewer to examine the operation of the detention 
laws and to review each individual case of detention.153 Significantly, there is no such 
equivalent review function in the United States for its enemy combatants. 
According to the Home Office, the judicial review proceedings have been rigorous, 
with applications for detentions being strenuously contested by the defense attorneys 
and lasting several hours. Not all detention orders have been granted and some have 
been granted for less time than requested.154 Between July 26, 2006, when pre-charge 
detention was increased to twenty-eight days, and October 2007, there were 204 arrests 
under the TA. Only eleven suspects were detained for more than fourteen days (eight of 
them where charged and three were released without charge).155 In other words, 
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although Britain can detain suspects up to twenty-eight days, it appears to be using its 
authority sparingly. 
During the summer of 2007, the Home Office tried to increase the twenty-eight day 
limit to fifty-six days of pre-charge detention. A government report issued by the Home 
Office in July 2007 argued that the police were investigating around 2,000 individuals 
for terrorist-related offenses and that the complexity of the investigations was escalating 
due to an increase in use of false identifies and international links which necessitated 
the cooperation of foreign governments.156  The report concluded: 
The Government is clear that it will only be necessary to go beyond twenty-eight 
days in exceptional circumstances – where there are multiple plots, or links with 
multiple countries, or exceptional levels of complexity. To ensure that any new 
limit is indeed used only in exceptional cases, we believe that any increase in the 
limit should be balanced by strengthening the accompanying judicial oversight 
and Parliamentary accountability.157 
Although the Home Office proposed four options to implement the extension to fifty-six 
days of pre-charge detention – with each option offering different varieties of judicial 
review and oversight – Parliament refused to extend pre-charge detention beyond 
twenty-eight days. Alternatively, the Home Office proposed civil emergency legislation 
that would allow for an additional thirty days’ detention (for a total of fifty-eight days) if 
Parliament declared an emergency.158  This option was also defeated by Parliament.  
By comparison, in America, Congress has utterly failed to involve itself in the details 
of preventive detention of U.S. persons, although it has passed the Detainee Treatment 
Act of 2005 and Military Commissions of Act of 2006 to deal with the foreign nationals 
at Guantanamo Bay. As explored earlier, while Congress did debate the DECA in 2005, 
which would have provided a statute to deal with preventive detention of U.S. persons as 
enemy combatants, it failed to pass and it does not appear that any alternatives are 
being proposed. While the Senate Judiciary Committee did hold hearings in June 2008 
concerning its terrorist detention policy at Guantanamo Bay, it has not yet enacted any 
legislation concerning the preventive detention of U.S. persons. In other words, while 
Britain’s and Israel’s respective legislatures have played an active role in their respective 
preventive detention regimes (whether called pre-charge detention or administration 
detention), Congress has been remarkably silent and deferential to the executive branch. 
Currently, the British government is trying to increase the twenty-eight day pre-
charge limit to forty-two days. In April 2008, Home Secretary Jacqui Smith introduced 
a new anti-terrorism package that would allow for pre-charge detention of up to forty-
two days and post-charge questioning of terrorist suspects.159 According to Smith, forty-
two days would only be used in exceptional cases such as those that require the 
cooperation of a foreign government.160  In June 2008, the House of Commons passed 
the measure by an extremely narrow margin, vote was 315 to 306, but it is not likely to 
pass the House of Lords when it comes up for debate in the Fall.161 
Although forty-two days of pre-charge detention is not nearly as severe as years of 
incommunicado and indefinite detention as advocated by the Bush Administration, the 
forty-two day proposal has sparked harsh criticism from civil liberties group within 
Britain. For instance, civil rights group Liberty has called the proposal unjust, arguing 
that “[t]he UK already has the longest period of pre-charge detention in the Western 
world, and there is no evidence that a further extension will make us any safer.”162 
Human Rights Watch has argued that the government could enact “rolling periods of 
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42-day pre-charge detention” by proposing new charges against terrorist suspects.163  
According to Ben Ward, Associate Europe and Central Asia Director at Human Rights 
Watch, increasing the pre-charge detention period more than twenty-eight days “denies 
the basic right to liberty” and is counterproductive as it is “a recipe for alienating 
communities vital to defeating terrorism.”  He explains that the proposals to increase 
pre-charge detention evoke the experience of internment in Northern Ireland: 
“Internment was deeply counterproductive in the fight against terrorism in Northern 
Ireland, and these proposals carry similar risks.”164  Amnesty International also argues 
the extending pre-charge detention risks “alienat[ing] affected communities, leading 
people to mistrust the authorities and mak[ing] them less likely to want to cooperate 
with the police.”165 
Critics contend that other measures should be used before increasing pre-charge 
detention, such as allowing suspects to be interviewed after they have been charged (and 
allowing refusals to answer to be held against them) and using telephone intercept 
material as evidence.166 Liberty Director Shami Chakrabarti maintains that she would 
support measures allowing for a suspect to be charged with a lesser offence, such as 
possessing explosive material or attending a terror camp, while investigations continued 
for more serious or related offences such as conspiracy to murder.167  
Curiously, some critics of Britain’s attempts to increase pre-charge detention beyond 
twenty-eight days argue that America compares favorably to Britain. In November 
2007, Liberty published an article entitled Terrorism Pre-Charge Detention 
Comparative Law Study, in which it compares Britain’s pre-charge detention to other 
countries, including America but not Israel. In this report, author Jago Russell argues 
that America only detains criminals for forty-eight hours under its criminal justice 
system while Britain’s twenty-eight days is excessive: 
Despite being a major terrorist target the United States, for example, allows only 
two days’ of pre-charge detention. . . . How can our Government sustain the 
argument that the UK police need over a month when so many other countries 
manage with pre-charge detention periods of less than a week?168  
In this war on terror, however, America has often bypassed its criminal justice system, 
arguing that terrorist suspects are enemy combatants who can be held incommunicado 
pursuant to the laws of war and released at the end of hostilities that may never end. 
While Russell acknowledges that America has detained individuals due to the 
executive’s “war powers” privilege, he argues such powers are not equivalent to pre-
charge detention in Britain as they are not part of the criminal justice system.169  
Nevertheless, while Britain’s twenty-eight days of pre-charge detention may be 
excessive, when it comes to preventive detention as a concept, it is hardly prudent to 
compare Britain’s twenty-eight days of pre-charge detention, which was passed by 
Parliament and has weekly judicial review incorporated within its provisions, to 
America’s enemy combatant policy where the executive branch has unilaterally decided 
to detain individuals for years of incommunicado detention. Russell notes: “If UK law is 
significantly more repressive than the law in other countries, some will use the disparity 
to question Britain’s moral authority.”170 Such a statement only applies a fortiori to the 
United States. 
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IV. Summary of Analysis: Britain versus United States 
Since 2000, Britain’s preventive detention regime has moved from seven days of pre-
charge detention to twenty-eight days of pre-charge detention with access to counsel 
after forty-eight hours and judicial review every seven days. While there has been debate 
about extending pre-charge detention to ninety, fifty-six, or currently forty-two days, 
there never has been an argument that pre-charge detention should be indefinite and 
without access to counsel. In fact, on June 2, 2008, in arguing that Britain should 
extend pre-charge detention from twenty-eight to forty-two days, Prime Minister 
Gordon Brown specifically stated in The Times that “our first principle is that there 
should always be a maximum limit on pre-charge detention. It is fundamental to our 
civil liberties that no one should be held arbitrarily for an unspecified period.”171 In 
other words, unlike President Bush who has argued for indefinite detention of enemy 
combatants with no judicial review, the executive branch in Britain has never asserted 
such authority in the war on terror. Furthermore, Parliament has not abdicated its 
responsibilities to its citizens: it has and continues to openly debate the issue. There is 
no executive usurpation of power as there was during the World Wars. 
By contrast, in the United States, Hamdi, Padilla and al-Marri – all U.S. persons – 
were locked up for years with no access to counsel. Al-Marri appears to be the only U.S. 
person currently detained as an enemy combatant, although he now has met with 
attorneys and, as of this writing, his case is pending an interlocutory appeal to the 
Supreme Court. Padilla was convicted of terrorism-related charges in August 2007 after 
serving over three years as an enemy combatant and is serving a seventeen year 
sentence, and Hamdi was released to Saudi Arabia in 2004 after the Supreme Court 
held that he must be provided a meaningful opportunity to rebut the designation as an 
enemy combatant. Yet, the precedent of unilateral executive war powers to detain 
American citizens as enemy combatants and hold them indefinitely is on the books. As 
Yale law professor Bruce Ackerman notes: “These cases [Padilla and Hamdi] present a 
unique threat to the survival of the republic. If the president can throw citizens into 
solitary confinement for years on end, our democracy is in very deep trouble.”172 While 
the Supreme Court has ruled that enemy combatants must be allowed a modicum of 
judicial review to challenge the factual assertion that they are enemy combatants, there 
is no prescribed timeframe for when it must occur and no timeframe for how long an 
enemy combatant can be denied counsel for purposes of enhancing interrogation 
potential. Even the proposed DECA did not contain such particulars. These details are 
apparently not significant enough to motivate Congress to legislate or move the 
Supreme Court to provide more than minimalist holdings in its decisions.  
While approximately 3,000 people died on September 11, Britain like Israel has faced 
decades of terrorist threats. For the worst twenty years of the conflict in Northern 
Ireland, 2,750 individuals were killed, 2,000 of them civilians, and more than 31,900 
seriously injured, all in a territory of 1.5 million people.173 Furthermore, between 1976 
and November 1998, ninety-four incidents of international terrorism took place in 
Britain, including the bomb planted on Pan Am Flight 103 that exploded over Lockerbie 
in 1988 killing 270 people.174 Moreover, al Qaeda killed fifty-two and injured 700 people 
in July 2005 by bombing public transportation in London, and in 2006, eight men tried 
to smuggle explosives in liquids onto airliners leaving Heathrow airport for the United 
States. Furthermore, it is well known that Britain has a substantial home-grown Islamic 
terrorist threat exacerbated by its class system and the radicalization of poor Muslims. 
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As of June 2008, according to Prime Minister Brown, there are at least 2,000 terrorist 
suspects, 200 networks or cells, and thirty active plots in Britain.175  It is simply not a 
credible argument that America’s harsher preventive detention policy is based on a 
larger threat posed by al Qaeda. As does Israel, Britain provides more due process and 
rights to its detainees than America, and the other branches of government do not 
appear to be so feeble. As Professor Schulhofer aptly notes: “In one important respect 
the British and Israeli experiences are unambiguous. They leave us with no illusion that 
the powers currently claimed by the U.S. government are in any sense normal, even for 
a situation of national crisis.”176 
Malaysia and Singapore have preventive detention regimes in which they can hold 
suspects for two-year periods without charge or meaningful court appearances based on 
mere suspicion that they might endanger national security.177 Considering the United 
States held Padilla as an enemy combatant for three and one-half years before charging 
him with a crime, and al-Marri has been held without charges since 2003, it seems as 
though the United States is more in the company of authoritarian regimes than of 
democracies such as Israel and Britain. It is questionable whether the threat posed by 
terrorism merits such a sacrifice of our democratic principles. 
CONCLUSION 
The United States was completely unprepared on 9/11 and the resulting enemy 
combatant policy seems to be an ad hoc response to insecurity. In comparing other 
countries’ approaches to preventive detention, the question should not be how does the 
United States create a perfect regime, because that cannot happen; the question is how 
does the United States create a regime that can at least provide some meaningful 
judicial review, some access to counsel, some congressional oversight, and some balance 
to unilateral executive discretion. While Britain’s and Israel’s approaches to preventive 
detention are not perfect – and frequently lambasted by their own human rights groups 
– they do demonstrate that democracies facing serious and long-term terrorist threats 
can provide more overall due process and substantive rights to detainees than America’s 
years of incommunicado and indefinite executive detention. Israel and Britain had the 
advantage (if it can be called that) of decades of dealing with terrorism before 9/11. It 
only makes sense that the United States should look to their experiences to see if any of 
their principles can be applied to the United States’ unique kind of government.   
Tom Malinowski of Human Rights Watch told Congress in June 2008 that “the U.S. 
Congress has never in its history formally established a system of preventive detention 
without trial to deal with national security threats.”178  The time is ripe for Congress to 
enact a preventive detention regime. As did the legislatures in Israel and Britain, 
Congress should address the substantive details concerning preventive detention such 
as how long an individual can be detained without access to counsel for purposes of 
interrogation and how long overall an individual can be detained before release or 
criminal changes. Israel and Britain have shown that democracies facing comparable 
terrorist threats can implement preventive detention policies that are not based on 
unilateral executive usurpation of power and that can provide more due process overall 
to detainees. Congress should take heed and legislate.  
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